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STUDENT Noms
PROCESS OF SERVICE-ON RESIDENTS ABSENT FROM STATE
IN ACTIONS IN PERSONAM
Section 419 of the Kentucky Civil Code provides that, "No personal
judgment shall be rendered against a defendant constructively sum-
moned, or summoned out of this state as is provided in Section 56, and
who has not appeared in the action". Thus a personal judgment can-
not be rendered against a resident and citizen of Kentucky who was
summoned while outside the state.' In fact, actual personal service
within the state is necessary in proceedings in personam 2
X leaves state A, the place of his residence temporarily, and is
sojourning in state B. While he is away suit is brought against him
on a promissory note, and in accordance with a statute he is per-
sonally served with notice. The court held, that service of process
upon a resident defendant, effected by actually handing him a copy of
the summons while outside the state, in compliance with a statute,
did not authorize the rendition of a personal judgment.$ The decision
Is based upon the ground that the statute is unconstitutional in that
the defendant was deprived of due process of law as is guaranteed to
him by the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The situation presented by the above case raises the following In-
quiries: First, whether a state can by statute authorize its courts to
obtain service of process upon its residents while they are outside its
boundaries In actions in personam; second, if so, what nature of
process would be sufficient; and third, whether such a statute Is de-
sirable?
That process from the courts of one state cannot run beyond its
own boundary lines and summons non-residents for the purpose of
securing a personal judgment was definitely settled by the case of
Pennoyer v. Veff.4 At common law, personal service upon residents
of the state was Indispensable and the process of Its courts could not
run beyond its own territorial jurisdiction and summons parties in
proceedings In personam.5 There is a division of authority as to
whether a state by statute can authorize its courts to assume juris-
diction over the person of a resident who Is served with process while
outside the state0 The Raher case Is not without support In holding
that It cannot,7 but it Is believed, both from authority and reason, that
the better rule Is otherwise.8 Professor Beale in his late treatise on
Highland v. Andas, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 703, 106 S. W. 866 (1908).
'Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S. W. 121 (1925).
'Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494 (1911).
4 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
"fBeale, Conflict of Laws, Vol. I, Sec. 79 (1).
Note in 50 L. R. A. 586; 35 L. R. A. (n. s.) 292.
1 De Ia Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345
(1896); Bernhart v. Brown, 118 N. C. 700, 24 S. E. 527 (1896); Smith
v. Grady, 68 Wis. 215, 31 N. W. 477 (1887).
'Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504, 7 Am. Rep. 551 (1870);
Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. 578 (1884); Hammill v. Talbott, 72 Mo.
App. 22 (1897).
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the conflict of laws says that a state has jurisdiction over its subjects
or citizens even though they are outside its boundaries; that it can by
legislation bind its absent subjects; and that it is for the state to
determine whether and how far it will confer jurisdiction upon its
courts over absent subjects or citizens? Another writer observes, "Nor
is it destructive of the extraterritorial effect of a judgment based upon
constructive service that the defendant being a citizen of the state,
was temporarily absent therefrom.""0
The power of a state to obtain process upon its citizens while
they are outside its territory, in actions in personam, is placed upon
the ground of the political status of citizenship. By establishing a
residence in a state and becoming its citizen, by invoking the protec-
tion of its laws and all the privileges and immunities of its citizen-
ship, there must of necessity be implied a consent to be bound by its
laws, its forms of procedure and its method of process. A resident of
a state, though physically absent therefrom, is ever constructively
within the state at least for the purpose of enjoying certain privi-
leges and rights of his citizenship. For instance, he may still exer-
cise his right of local suffrage, his children may still patronize the
public schools and he still has the right to have whatever property he
may own protected by the laws of that state. If he is constructively
within the state for the purpose of retaining his rights of citizenship,
there is no valid reason why he should not at the same time be held
amenable to the process of its courts. He should not be able to claim
the benefits and immunities of citizenship on the one hand and escape
the burdens exacted by the state upon its citizens, on the other hand.,'
It may be inferred from the opinion in the Raher case that the chief
obstacle was the act of the state, viz.: service of the summons taking
place outside its boundaries, and that some form of substituted serv-
ice such as leaving a copy of the summons at defendant's last usual
place of abode, would have been suffcient. But it would seem that
actual personal service, regardless of where it takes place, is to be pre-
ferred to any form of constructive service which at the most makes
It only probable that notice will actually be received.
Of course, a state could not get jurisdiction over every absent
party who has ceased to be its resident and has established another
domicile. The decisions seem to sustain the view that if the defend-
ant leaves the state intending never to return, its courts then lose
their jurisdiction over his person. 2 Technically, perhaps such party
has so lost his residence as to render the state powerless to get juris-
diction over his person. The objection to this view is the extreme dif-
ficulty in determining the intention of the defendant at the time he
'Beale, Conflict Laws, Vol. I, Sec. 80 (1).
"Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.), Vol. 3, See. 1376.
"Mabee v. McDonald, 107 Texas 139, 175 S. W. 676 (1915).
'Amsbaugh v. Exchange Bank, 33 Kan. 100, 5 Pac. 436 (1885);
Mastin v. Gray, 19 Kan. 458 (1878); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90
(1917).
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left the state. It would seem more practicable to hold him amenable
to the process of the courts of the state from which he left until he
has established another domicile.u After all a person can have only
one domicile and it should be more easily determined than the inten-
tion of the defendant.
Assuming that one may be absent from a state and still be a
resident thereof and amenable to the process of its courts, then, any
mode of service may be authorized provided it is reasonably calculated
to notify the defendant and give him an opportunity to be heard.'
"And a state may by statute provide for some form of service of
process other than personal service upon its citizens or subjects."15
Substituted service "by leaving a copy of the summons at the defend-
ant's residence has been upheld as sufficient.1 6 Even service upon a
resident absent from the state has been upheld as due process in a
few Instances." In the case of Mabee v. McDonald, it was held that
service upon an absent resident by publication in a local newspaper
was sufficient to authorize the rendition of a personal judgment. That
this decision tends to impose personal liability on an absent party
upon process where the probability is that no actual notice will be
received at all, Is evidenced by the fact that this Texas case was
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. That court
through Justice Holmes said, "Perhaps in view of his technical posi-
tion and the actual presence of defendant's family in the state, a sum-
mons left at his last and usual place of abode would have been enough.
But it appears to us that an advertisement in a local newspaper is
not sufficient notice to bind a person who has left a state not intend-
Ing to return. To dispense with personal service, the substitute that
Is most likely to reach defendant is the least that ought to be required
if substantial justice is to be done. It is going to the extreme to hold
that jurisdiction was acquired by service at the last and usual place
of abode.1'' The dictum in this decision strongly suggests that substi-
tuted service by leaving a copy of the summons at defendant's last
usual place of abode would have been sufficient. But it seems that
service by publication In a local newspaper in such a case is inade-
quate because its tendency to notify the defendant is too remote. But
It would seem that thd jurisdictional efficacy of actual personal service
should be beyond question.
The advisability of a statute providing for service upon an absent
resident in proceedings in personam, is a matter of legislative policy.
No citizen should be deprived of a just cause of action merely because
'*Ayer v. Weeks, 65 N. H. 248, 6 L. R. A. 716 (1889) ; Cobb v. Rice,
130 Mass. 231 (1881).
14 Bickerdike v. Allen, 157 Ill. 95, 41 N. E. 740 (1895); Fleming v.
West, 98 Ga. 778, 27 S. E. 157 (1896).
"Beale, Conflict Laws, Vol I, See. 80 (2).
Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429, 79 Am. Dec. 440 (1861).
T Supra, Note 11.
14Supra, Note 11.
21 McDonald v. Mabee, supra, Note 12.
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the defendant saw fit to wander .outside the territorial limits of the
state, even for a legitimate business purpose, and until he establishes
another domicile he should be considered a resident of the state which
he left and therefore amenable to its laws. And such absent party
should not be permitted to object to any form of process so long as it
is reasonably calculated to notify him and give a chance to be heard.
Would it not be better to provide a method of process whereby a plain-
tiE could reach the defendant, even though outside the state, rather
than force him to follow up his adversary and submit his case to a
foreign jurisdiction or else go without a remedy? Kentucky has seen
the mischief arising from this type of situation in the case of non-
resident automobilists who have an accident while driving through the
state, and has provided for a method of constructive service upon such
non-resident.w It is submitted that it is expedient for Kentucky to
adopt similar legislation with respect to absent residents in all actions
in personam.
C-HA&s TiG oo.
"Ky. Stat. (1933 Supp.) See. 12-1.
